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ABSTRACT
Recent efforts to restructure and partially deregulate electricity markets have renewed interest in
understanding how consumers respond to price changes. Several interrelated problems complicate
demand analyses of these markets, including nonlinear pricing, heterogeneity in households’ price
sensitivities, and data aggregation. This paper formulates a model of household electricity demand that
addresses these difficulties. We estimate the model using data for a representative sample of California
households, and summarize how electricity demand elasticities vary in that state. We then use the model
to analyze the electricity consumption and expenditure effects of recent tariff structure changes in
California.
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In regulated industries, private ﬁrms and public agencies commonly price their ser-
vices using complex tariffs. The structure of these tariffs reﬂect a rich set of objec-
tives, involving both efﬁciency concerns and provision of speciﬁc beneﬁts to distinct
consumer groups. A shortcoming of this phenomenon is that a great deal of effort is re-
quired to alter these tariffs in response to evolving demand or cost conditions. This is
especially true in markets for ‘essential’ household services, such as electricity, water,
or local phone service, where price changes can provoke considerable public concern.
In these settings, it is useful to have demand models that indicate how households’
consumption and expenditures would change in response to a new tariff system.
In this paper, we present a model of household electricity demand. Although the
econometric literature on electricity demand is extensive, surprisingly few papers have
examined how demand is affected by the structure of a ﬁrm’s tariffs. This despite the
fact that nonlinear tariff designs are ubiquitous in these markets, and are chosen by
ﬁrms and regulatory agencies to inﬂuence consumer behavior. Moreover, studies that
have considered the implications of nonlinear pricing generally do so in a ‘reduced
form’ manner. In the absence of an underlying behavioral model, the results cannot be
used to simulate how consumption would differ under an alternative tariff structure.
The model we estimate examines the inﬂuence of tariff design on consumer behav-
ior. Our approach is based upon a microeconomic analysis of demand under nonlinear
pricing, so that the estimated model can be used to evaluate consumption behavior
under different tariff structures. The framework also addresses several estimation is-
sues present in markets with nonlinear prices, including consumer self-selection along
a nonlinear price schedule, tariffs tailored to customer-speciﬁc characteristics (such
as price discounts to lower-income households), and heterogeneity in consumers’ price
sensitivities. Models that ignore these important features will tend to mis-specify price
effects and yield misleading predictions of demand behavior.
We estimate the model using data for a representative probability sample of Cali-
fornia households, obtained primarily from the Residential Energy Consumption Sur-
vey of the U.S. Department of Energy. The rich detail on appliance holdings and
dwelling characteristics in these data allow us to model the considerable variation in
households’ electricity use and price sensitivity. Each household in the data is matched
with its complete, seasonally-varying electric rate schedule for the purposes of this
study. The use of disaggregated rate schedule information is a central feature of the
analysis, both to minimize speciﬁcation error in estimation and to evaluate individual
behavioral responses to alternative rate structures.
1The ﬁnal portion of the paper examines the effects of a new tariff design in Califor-
nia. Following an electricity supply crisis in that state, regulatory authorities recently
approved a novel, ﬁve-part tariff structure for household electricity consumption. This
design was intended to induce energy conservation, raise additional revenue for util-
ities, and minimize expenditure changes for lower-income households. Due to its un-
precedented form, however, little was known about how well the new system would
achieve these objectives prior to the tariff adoption. We use the estimated demand
model to illustrate the effects of these complex tariff changes.
The paper proceeds in two distinct parts. The ﬁrst addresses demand models with
nonlinear prices. Section 2 lays the economic groundwork for our empirical methods,
and highlights why our approach differs from earlier electricity demand studies. In
particular, it summarizes how consumption with a nonlinear price schedule relates
to the demand speciﬁcations normally estimated in applied research. Section 3 dis-
cusses stochastic speciﬁcations and the endogenous customer sorting problem that oc-
curs with nonlinear prices. Our treatment casts these inter-related issues in a self-
selection framework, along the lines of Heckman (1979). The analysis extends Hane-
mann’s (1984) and Hausman’s (1985) techniques for modeling choice with nonlinear
budget constraints.
The balance of the paper centers on the application. Section 4 describes the empiri-
cal model of household electricity demand. Building on prior work, this model explains
heterogeneity in households’ electricity price elasticities in terms of appliance hold-
ings and use. In Section 5 we discuss estimation using an exact (non-linear) method
of moments. This allows us to avoid certain temporal aggregation biases common to
electricity demand research. Section 6 summarizes the data, and Section 7 presents
estimation results, elasticities, and an out-of-sample test of the model. In Section 8 we
then illustrate how the model and methods lend themselves to analyzing prospective
tariff changes, such as California’s complex new tariff design.
2 Consumer Demand with Nonlinear Prices
Most nonlinear price schedules take the form of multi-part tariffs. In a multi-part tar-
iff, the marginal price charged to a consumer changes in a step-wise fashion with the
quantity demanded. Depending on the context, these tariffs may exhibit increasing or
decreasing marginal prices. Figure 1 depicts a simple two-part increasing price sched-
ule, s(p); in which the consumer pays a low price pL for each unit up to the quantity  x,
and a higher price pH thereafter. This type of increasing block (or “tiered”) price sched-
ule is used by most California electric utilities. In other regions, electricity tariffs are
2commonly decreasing and thereby provide volume discounts. Empirical methods for
analyzing increasing and decreasing price schedules proceed along similar lines, al-
beit with some adjustments. For simplicity, we shall focus below on the increasing-tier
case shown in Figure 1.
Economic theory offers considerable guidance on how consumers will respond to
nonlinear prices. Since at least Gabor (1955), economists have realized that multi-part
prices imply that the consumer faces a nonlinear (i.e., a kinked) budget constraint. The
demand behavior of a utility-maximizing consumer thus depends not on the average
price, nor any single marginal price, but on the entire price schedule. The difﬁculty
that arises in empirical work is how to incorporate a complex price schedule into a
demand speciﬁcation in a way that is consistent with economic theory yet tractable
empirically.
The standard econometric approach to this problem, which traces to Hall (1973),
is to ‘linearize’ the budget constraint. This amounts to using the plane tangent to
the consumer’s nonlinear budget constraint at the optimal consumption bundle as its
linear approximation. By doing so, one can express demand under nonlinear pricing
in terms of the ordinary demand function of classical consumer theory, which assumes
a linear budget constraint.
To be speciﬁc, let x(p;y) be the ordinary demand function that indicates the con-
sumer’s desired quantity facing a constant (marginal and average) price p and income
y.1 Then the optimal consumption bundle x for a consumer faced with an increasing
nonlinear price schedule satisﬁes
x = x(p;y) (1)
where p is the slope of the approximating linear budget constraint and y = y+ x(p−
pL): In economic terms, p is the consumer’s equilibrium marginal willingness-to-pay
and y is the income level that would induce consumption x at this (constant) price.2
With (1), the demand speciﬁcation problem under nonlinear pricing can be recast in
terms of the ordinary demand function familiar to applied work. Note that both p and
x are endogenously determined, according to the three-equation system consisting of
(1), the expression for y, and the nonlinear price schedule s(p).3
1To strip the analysis to its essentials, we implicitly assume a two-good setting with strictly convex
preferences and that the outside good serves as a numeraire.
2Note that p
 is the consumer’s marginal willingness-to-pay, which is not necessarily the consumer’s
marginal price. The two will differ when demand crosses supply in the ‘gap’ between the two tiers in
the price schedule (see Fig. 1), in which case p
 takes a value between p
L and p
H but the marginal price
remains p
L.
3The case with decreasing block prices is slightlymore complex, because of the possibilitythat demand
3Nearly all previous studies of household electricity demand have based estima-
tion—either implicitly or explicitly—on a single-equation analog of equation (1). Be-
cause the marginal price is simultaneously determined by a supply equation and a
demand equation, standard econometric arguments imply that ordinary least squares
estimation using p will yield biased and inconsistent estimates of demand parameters.
Recognizing as much, most previous studies have used either an exogenous proxy for
the marginal price or instrumental variables procedures in estimation. While either
method can alleviate the endogeneity problem, both introduce biases of their own: the
former due to mis-speciﬁcation of the appropriate marginal price, and the latter be-
cause of the difﬁculty in ﬁnding good instruments (that do not a priori belong in the
demand equation) in this setting. As neither of these problems are readily dismissed,
it becomes worthwhile to consider more sophisticated estimation methods.
An alternative formulation of this problem lends itself to econometric procedures
that avoid these difﬁculties. The basic idea is to use the ‘supply equals demand’ rep-
resentation in Figure 1 to determine consumption. This amounts to solving the three-
equation system described above for x as a function of the individual terms in the
price schedule. By reference to Figure 1, we can determine consumption by evaluating





x(pL;y) if x(pL;y) <  x
x(pH;yH) if x(pH;yH) >  x
 x if otherwise,
(2)
where yH = y + x  (pH − pL). Equation (2) indicates that consumption is given by
demand at the low price when the ﬁrst tier is on the margin, by demand at the high
price plus an income effect when the second tier is on the margin, and by the quantity
 x when demand crosses supply in the ‘gap’ between the two tiers of the price schedule.
The term  x  (pH − pL) that is added to income in the second case is the rate structure
discount: it is the difference between the expenditure necessary to purchase the higher
quantities x >  x under non-linear pricing, and that necessary to purchase x at a con-
stant price of pH: In essence, when x >  x the lower price for inframarginal quantities
produces an income effect.4
may have multiple crossings of the price (supply) schedule. In that event these three equations have
multiple solutions, and a fourth equation (involving the indirect utility function) is needed to determine
consumption. This is straightforward if the econometric demand speciﬁcation admits a known indirect
utility function; see, e.g., Hausman (1985).
4Taylor (1975) contains an early discussion of this issue. Technically speaking, the ﬁrst two cases in
equation (2) are mutually exclusive only if certain restrictions on preferences hold. For a normal good
(one whose consumption rises with income), these amount to assuming that the income effect is not ‘too
4In principle, one could base an empirical model of demand under nonlinear pricing
on either (1) or (2). In practice, (2) offers some distinct advantages. The ﬁrst is that (2)
expresses demand in terms of the exogenous price schedule facing the consumer, rather
than the endogenously-chosen marginal price. By ‘solving out’ the marginal price,
the simultaneity problems arising in econometric analyses using (1) can therefore be
avoided. No instrumental variables nor price schedule approximations are needed.
Second, (2) shows precisely how the individual terms of a nonlinear price sched-
ule enter the demand decision. If one proceeds from an empirical speciﬁcation of the
ordinary demand function that is consistent with (or perhaps derived from) some prim-
itive utility speciﬁcation, then (2) indicates how a nonlinear price schedule should be
explicitly incorporated to maintain internal consistency. The discrete form in (2) is an
inherent consequence of optimizing behavior when consumers face multi-part tariffs.
In this section, we have indicated how the ordinary demand function of classi-
cal consumer theory relates to consumption decisions when consumers face nonlinear
prices. This is useful for two purposes—ﬁtting demand models to existing consump-
tion data, and making predictions for new price schedules of a similar form. To be more
speciﬁc about how to do these tasks, it is necessary to consider stochastic speciﬁcations
for demand.
3 Stochastic Speciﬁcations and Expected Consumption
In empirical work, consumer demand functions typically take the form
x(p;y;z;")
where z represents observed consumer characteristics, and " is a stochastic term. This
type of demand function implicitly assumes the consumer can purchase any quantity
desired at a constant price p. When this assumption is valid, the economic interpreta-
tion of the stochastic term is usually of little consequence for estimation.
When consumers face nonlinear prices, the interpretation given to the stochastic
term has economic ramiﬁcations. In a structural model, the usual interpretation of
the stochastic term is that it reﬂects (in whole or in part) unobservable heterogeneity
in consumers’ preferences. That is, the individual consumer is assumed to know his
or her particular value of ", but the ﬁrm and the econometrician do not and so treat "
large’; or, more speciﬁcally, that the income effect of the rate structure discount does not dominate the
substitution effect of the higher marginal price. If this fails, the conditioning event inequalities in (2) are
more complex.
5as random. In this setting, the probability distribution of " conveys information about
how willingness-to-pay varies in the population.
This poses some interesting complications for estimating consumer demand func-
tions and calculating expected demand. With a multi-part tariff schedule, such as the
one illustrated in Figure 1, consumers will sort themselves between tariff segments
according to willingness-to-pay. The marginal price is therefore self-selected in a way
that depends upon the observed as well as the unobserved characteristics of the con-
sumer. This selection induces correlation between the marginal price and the stochas-
tic term. For example, suppose that " enters the demand function additively, and the
consumer faces an increasing two-tier price schedule. Then a consumer with an un-
usually low value of "—due to, say, idiosyncratic preferences for energy conservation
or extended travel away from home—will tend to have low total consumption and con-
sequently a lower marginal price. Ceteris paribus, consumers on the lower marginal
price will tend to be drawn from the lower end of the distribution of ", and consumers
on the higher marginal price will tend to be drawn from the upper end of the distribu-
tion of ". This sorting makes calculating expected demand difﬁcult, because one must
account for the consumer’s willingness to switch tariff segments (thus marginal prices)
when integrating out the unobservables.
Handling these complications requires explicitly modeling the selection behavior
of the consumer. We will do so assuming the consumer’s ordinary demand function
(demand at a constant price p) takes the econometric form
x(p;y;z;)+" (3)
where  is a set of parameters to be estimated. The additive separability of " is not
strictly necessary for what follows, but will simplify the analysis and make certain
relations more transparent.
Consider ﬁrst the consumption decision from the perspective of the consumer, who
knows his or her value of ". From the analysis in Section 2, we can represent this
choice in a form analogous to equation (2). Speciﬁcally, if a consumer with the ordinary
demand function in (3) encounters a price schedule of the type in Figure 1, then her





x(pL;y;z;)+" if "<c 1
 x if c1 <"<c 2
x(pH;yH;z;)+" if ">c 2
(4)
where c1 = x − x(pL;y;z;) and c2 = x − x(pH;yH;z;): The lower and upper cutoff
6values c1 and c2 satisfy c1 <c 2 for any downward-sloping demand function, provided
that income effects are not too large.5 They partition the range of " into three regions:
if "<c 1, then consumption occurs on the low-price tier, if ">c 2 then consumption
occurs on the high-price tier, and if c1 <"<c 2 then demand crosses supply in the ‘gap’
between the two tiers of the price schedule.
From an econometric perspective, equation (4) is a censored regression model in
which the censoring occurs in the interior of the distribution of outcomes rather than
the tails. Such models are generally estimated by maximum likelihood methods, us-
ing the discrete structure in (4) to derive the change-of-variables from an (assumed)
marginal distribution of " to the distribution of x. Burtless and Hausman (1978) de-
velop a maximum likelihood implementation for a general censoring model with this
structure. Their method, later extended by Hausman (1985) and others, has been
widely applied for modeling labor supply decisions subject to nonlinear income taxa-
tion.6
In the present analysis, we are interested in both estimating a model of demand
behavior and calculating expected consumption under observed and alternative tariff
schedules. We therefore eschew maximum likelihood in favor of an exact moment-
based estimation approach. This has the desirable feature that the analytic machinery
needed to perform expected demand calculations (for current and alternative tariff
schedules) is readily available from the model’s estimating conditions.7
To obtain an expression for expected consumption, we can integrate (4) piecewise.
Let w represent the set of observable characteristics affecting the household’s con-
sumption decision: w = fpL;p H;  x;y;zg: To simplify notation, we will write xH() for












where P is the (conditional) probability distribution of ",g i v e nw.T h i s i s a s i m p l e
probability-weighted average of expected demand within each segment of the price
schedule. To apply (5) to data, we will assume a parametric speciﬁcation for the dis-
tribution of the unobservables. Speciﬁcally, if P is the normal distribution with mean
5Cf. ftn. 4.
6See Mofﬁtt (1986) for a survey.
7There are also computational reasons to prefer this approach to maximum likelihood, which we ad-
dress in Section 5.
7zero and variance , then expected consumption becomes
E(xjw)=[ xL() − 1]1 + x  (2 − 1)+[ xH()+2](1− 2) (6)
where 1 = 1=1 and 2 = 2=(1 − 2) are the inverse Mills ratios, 1 and 2 are the
standard normal density evaluated at c1()= and c2()=, and 1 and 2 the standard
normal distribution function at c1()= and c2()=.
Several points are worth noting here. In statistical terms, equation (5) is integrat-
ing demand over the joint probability distribution of the consumer’s marginal price
and the unobservables. It recognizes the fact that the consumer’s marginal price is re-
lated to ", and changes—in a discrete, endogenous way—as " varies. What makes this
integration tractable is that price schedules are discrete, so that the marginal price
and " are conditionally independent within each ‘step’ of the price schedule.
Second, there is a close parallel here to the sample-selection models in the econo-
metric literature. The terms in square brackets in (6) are essentially ‘Heckit’-style
conditional expectation functions. They correct for the fact that, given w,c o n s u m e r s
that sort onto the lower marginal price are different in their unobservable character-
istics than those who choose the higher-tier price. The parallel to sample-selectivity
problems arise because, in both that and the present analysis, consumers are sorting
along a budget constraint. In traditional models of labor supply decisions (for example,
Heckman (1974)), consumers with different reservation wages choose whether or not
to participate in a labor market, effectively sorting between interior and boundary so-
lutions on the labor-leisure budget set. In the present analysis, consumers are simply
sorting between different segments of a nonlinear (i.e., kinked) budget constraint. The
present situation generates greater information about the distribution of consumer
preferences, however, because consumers can equate price to marginal willingness-to-
pay at (two) different price levels. This makes (6) a more complex expression than the
expectation functions employed in traditional selection models.8
In the empirical analysis of demand behavior, the expected consumption equation
in (6) serves two roles. It can be used to estimate a model of demand when consumers
face nonlinear tariffs of the form in Figure 1; and, given the estimated demand model,
8At the risk of confusing matters, there is one other difference between the present analysis and
traditional models of labor market supply. The analysis here is more complicated because the supply
and demand system is “nonrecursive.” That is, in traditional labor supply models, the individual’s labor
supply function depends on the market wage, but the market wage is constant irrespective of the labor
hours supplied. The slope of the budget constraint is therefore exogenous. In the present analysis, the
quantitydemanded depends on the marginal price (through substitutionbehavior) andthe marginal price
depends on the quantity consumed (through the price schedule). This leads to simultaneity problems (as
discussed in Section 2) in addition to the self-selection behavior above.
8it can be used to calculate how expected consumption would differ under an alterna-
tive tariff of the same structure. Of course, this framework is easily generalized to
more complex tariff structures, which might include ﬁxed charges or additional tariff
segments. We illustrate the latter in Section 8.
4 Household Electricity Demand
To obtain an estimable model, we now consider in detail the speciﬁcation of a house-
hold electricity demand function x(p;y;z;).
Like many household services, electricity is not consumed directly by individuals.
Rather, a demand for electricity is derived from the ﬂow of services provided by a
household’s durable energy-using appliances. This characteristic of electricity use im-
plies a useful distinction between short-run and long-run demand elasticities. The
‘short-run’ refers to demand behavior taking a household’s existing appliance stock as
given. For example, in response to an increase in the price of electricity, a household
might tolerate a warmer air conditioner setting or reduce the number of hours a pool
ﬁlter operates. In contrast, long-run elasticities are meant to incorporate both changes
in utilization behavior and any adjustments to the stock of appliances owned by the
household.
This distinction is important for modeling demand behavior. The long-run effects
of electricity price changes are an equilibrium outcome of households’ appliance re-
placement decisions (on the demand side) and appliance manufacturers’ choices of
technological characteristics and prices for new appliances (on the supply side). Un-
fortunately, our present (cross-sectional survey) data does not contain the longitudinal
information necessary to estimate how these replacement decisions are prompted by
changing energy prices. Thus, we focus on analyzing short-run demand elasticities,
and leave appliance replacement decisions for subsequent research. Our results there-
fore inform changes in demand due to changes in appliance utilization behavior, rather
than through equilibrium appliance stock adjustments.9
This approach to modeling electricity demand amounts to conditioning econometric
analysis on households’ existing appliance stocks. In doing so, an important question
becomes how best to incorporate information on appliance holdings into demand spec-
iﬁcations. Households vary markedly in the set of appliances they own, so it is natural
9The element of technological change in appliance manufacturers’ choices makes estimating the long-
run effects of electricity price changes particularly complex. One effort to do so is the EPRI Residential
End-Use Energy Planning System (REEPS) micro-simulation models; see Goett and McFadden (1985).
These models build on Dubin and McFadden’s (1984) model of contemporaneous appliance choice and
utilization decisions.
9to expect the factors inﬂuencing electricity demand in one household will differ from
those in the next. For example, an elderly household that uses central air conditioning
much of the summer might be willing to alter its thermostat setting in response to a
small change in the price of electricity, which can yield a large change in its electricity
consumption. In contrast, a single-person household that uses electricity to operate
only a refrigerator and a few lights might exhibit little or no demand response even to
large price changes. This suggests that both a household’s electricity consumption and
its price sensitivity may depend delicately on the speciﬁc types of appliances it holds.10
A useful way of modeling this heterogeneity is to specify electricity demand func-
tions at the level of the individual appliance. This allows different factors to affect
electricity demand for different appliances, and thus for different households. This
approach to modeling electricity demand is feasible with household-level data, pro-
vided both appliance ownership and energy consumption are observed. In our data,
however, electricity consumption is not recorded at the level of the individual appli-
ance; rather, we observe only total household electricity consumption (at the level of
the household’s electric meter). Consequently, we treat the electricity used by each
of a household’s individual appliances as a latent, or unobserved, outcome. We then
aggregate these appliance-level demand speciﬁcations to obtain a model of household
electricity demand.11
Speciﬁcally, we treat total household demand as the sum of electricity used by K
distinct appliance categories. These categories include space heating, water heating,
air conditioning, refrigeration, pools, and a residual category of other electrical ap-
pliances. If a household owns an appliance of type k =1 ;2;:::;K, we assume that
electricity consumption (per billing period) for the category, xk, takes the linear form
xk = kp + γky + z0
kk + "k (7)
where p is the price of electricity, y household income, zk a vector of observable house-
hold characteristics, and "k unobservable household characteristics. The unknown
demand parameters k;γ k; and k are assumed constant across households and are to
be estimated. Depending on the appliance, the category-speciﬁc vector zk may include
household demographic information, dwelling structure characteristics, appliance at-
10A separate issue not examined here is that the choice of major appliances in a residence is ultimately
endogenous, and may be statisticallyendogenous to a model of utilization behavior. Dubin and McFadden
(1984) present some evidence on this issue in the choice of gas versus electric home heating systems.
11This latent-variables approach to modeling electricity consumption is implicit in Fisher and Kaysen’s
(1962) pioneering work on aggregate electricity demand. Later studies using related approaches include
Parti and Parti (1980), Barnes, Gillingham, and Hagemann (1981), and Dubin (1985).
10tributes, and (contemporaneous billing-period) weather data. We interpret equation
(7) as household demand when it faces a constant (marginal and average) price, p.
As noted above, we do not observe electricity consumption at the level of the in-
dividual appliance; rather, we observe total household electricity consumption. Total




dk xk ; (8)
where x is total household electricity consumption and
dk =
(
1 if household owns appliance type k
0 if otherwise.
With household appliance ownership information, we can insert (7) into (8) to obtain















which we will collapse to
x = p + γy + z0 + " (9)
by setting  =
P
k dkk, γ =
P
k dkγk, and so on. Although equation (9) looks like a
conventional linear demand function, the price, income, and other slope coefﬁcients
depend upon the household’s appliance portfolio. Notice that we are not estimat-
ing  directly, but rather the parameters 1; 2;:::; K that characterize the price-
sensitivity of each appliance category (and similarly for γ, ). Thus, this speciﬁcation
allows households with numerous electricity-intensive appliances, such as air condi-
tioners, swimming pools, or electric space heating systems, to exhibit different price
and income elasticities than households without such appliances.
In interpreting equation (9), it is important to note that it corresponds conceptually
to the conventional demand function x(p;y) of classical consumer theory, as discussed
earlier. That is, it speciﬁes the amount of electricity the household would consume
if it faced income level y and a constant price p for electricity. This differs from the
situation in our data, where households face a nonlinear price schedule with marginal
prices pL and pH. In that case, the optimal consumption level is given by evaluating
demand using the schedule derived in equation (4). The expected value of demand is
similarly determined, by appropriately inserting the demand speciﬁcation (9) into the
11expected consumption equation (6).
Variances
An important aspect of this model of electricity demand is that the household-level
demand error, ", is heteroscedastic. This occurs because the stochastic term in the
household-level demand speciﬁcation is the sum of the stochastic terms associated
with the K appliance utilization equations (7). The variance of the household-level
stochastic term therefore depends upon which appliances are held by the individual
household.
Speciﬁcally, from the expressions leading to (9), the variance of the household-level






djdk cov("j;" k) (10)
 (d1;d 2;:::;d K)2:
Thus, even if the stochastic term in a particular appliance utilization equation is as-
sumed to have constant variance across households, the household-level stochastic
term will not have constant variance. We tend to think of the appliance-level stochas-
tic terms as reﬂecting households’ idiosyncratic tastes for utilizing appliances. A vari-
ety of behavioral considerations then suggest that the covariance terms entering (10)
will tend to be positive, so that the variance of the household-level stochastic term will
increase with the number of appliances owned.
From an econometric perspective, equation (10) is a simple model of group-wise
heteroscedasticity in which the ‘group’ is a speciﬁc portfolio of household appliances.
Normally, this would not be a major concern for estimating the parameters of a linear
demand speciﬁcation such as (9). When consumers face nonlinear prices, however, the
variance of the household-level stochastic term affects the likelihood that a consumer
will fall on one tariff segment or another. This can be seen immediately from equa-
tion (6), where (the root of) the variance term, , enters the conditional expectation
function and the tariff segment probabilities. The variance of unobserved tastes thus
affects expected consumption calculations, and consistent estimation of the demand
parameters.
125 Estimation
In theory, one can estimate the model given by (4) and (9) using several different meth-
ods. In practice, however, both data limitationsand computational considerations limit
the appeal of likelihood-based estimators. Before turning to the speciﬁc estimation
technique we employ, we ﬁrst describe two issues that affect estimation procedures.
These relate to aggregation of the household’s consumption decisions over time, and a
partial identiﬁcation problem of the model with normally-distributed unobservables.
5.1 Aggregation over Time
Because electricity is sold using a nonlinear price schedule, there is an important tem-
poral aspect to electricity demand. In practice, the multi-part tariffs discussed in Sec-
tions 2 and 3 apply to households’ electricity consumption on a monthly basis. In
contrast, the data available to us provide only annual household electricity consump-
tion information. This temporal mismatch creates a potential source of aggregation
bias, since the household may choose to consume at different prices during different
times of the year.
There are both supply (price schedule) and demand-based reasons to expect the
household’s marginal price will vary over the course of the year. First, many household
electricity uses are seasonal and weather-sensitive (e.g., air conditioning and space
heating). These appliances are quite energy-intensive, and can easily push a house-
hold onto a higher segment of its tariff schedule during the months these appliances
are used. Second, even if a household’s electricity demand did not change from month
to month, electricity tariff schedules do—both because of seasonal tariff changes (rates
differ between summer and winter) and mid-year regulatory adjustments. No single
price schedule applies to all of a household’s annual consumption activity.
The problems this poses for estimation are considerable. When only annual con-
sumption data are available, the household’s monthly consumption and actual mar-
ginal prices are unobserved. Consequently, there is no way to know what sequence
of monthly marginal prices generated a household’s aggregate consumption outcome.
In a completely linear demand model, this is of no special concern because annual
demand depends on only the average annual price. When consumers face nonlinear
prices, however, no such simpliﬁcations are possible. The aggregation must be modeled
explicitly to avoid mis-specifying the effect of price on demand.
A second, and more subtle, issue is that the same applies to the effect of weather
and other time-varying covariates. Precisely because consumers face nonlinear tariffs,
the effects of other time-varying covariates will tend to be confounded in aggregate
13data. For example, a decrease in demand over a period of several cooler-than-usual
summer months could be due solely to the effect of the weather, or due to an increase
in seasonal tariffs during the summer, or due to a composition of these two simultane-
ous effects. With only annual data, it becomes difﬁcult to disentangle and separately
identify the direct effect of monthly marginal price changes. Yet this is precisely what
is required if we are to understand the effects of changing tariff schedules on consump-
tion behavior.
Addressing this problem constructively requires some information about the way
prices and other time-varying covariates change during the year. For the present anal-
ysis, we obtained location-speciﬁc monthly weather information and complete season-
ally-varying electric rate schedules for each household in the data. This allows us to
model the household’s monthly consumption decisions explicitly, treating the unob-
served monthly consumption outcomes as latent variables. We then aggregate these
latent variables to obtain a demand model that matches the annual consumption out-
comes available.
More precisely, let wt denote the set of observable variables affecting the house-
hold’s consumption decision in month t, including the applicable monthly price sched-
ule and that month’s weather conditions. Let x
t denote the household’s electricity
consumption in month t, and xa =
P12
t=1 x
t the household’s annual electricity con-
sumption. The value of x
t for month t is determined by (4), using the right-hand side
covariates for that month.
To estimate the model using a method of moments, we require an expression for
the expected value of annual demand, E[xajw1;w 2;:::;w 12]: Exploiting linearity of ex-







tjwt] is as deﬁned in (6). That is, we evaluate the (conditional) expectation
of annual demand by evaluating the monthly expected consumption equation twelve
times, using the appropriate covariates for each month. There is no simple form for
otherwise calculating the expected value of annual demand.12
12In theory, one could estimate this model more efﬁciently using maximum likelihood, or possibly Heck-
man’s (1979) two-stage technique for censored regression models. Unfortunately, maximum-likelihood
methods quickly becomes computationally intractable when consumption decisions made at varying
prices are aggregated. To illustrate, the likelihood function for one monthly consumption outcome in
this model is a mixed continuous/discrete function, with three discrete segments (this follows from (4);
see Hausman (1985) for more details). In contrast, the likelihood function for the sum of twelve month’s
consumption outcomes involves 3
12, or approximately 531 thousand distinct segments. While there is
14Equation (11) makes an assumption regarding the additive separability of the con-
ditioning sets. This entails some restrictions on household substitution behavior over
time. If we assume that households consume electricity out of permanent rather than
contemporaneous (i.e., monthly) income, the only time-varying elements in wt are the
weather-related covariates (monthly heating and cooling degree-days) and the price
schedules (being seasonal). Equation (11) makes the implicit assumption that, con-
ditional on a household’s existing appliance stock, knowledge of the electricity price
schedules and weather patterns for past and future months this year has no effect on
the current month’s consumption. While untestable directly, this is a tenable assump-
tion given that electricity is a non-storable commodity: Households cannot stockpile it
in anticipation of higher demand or prices in other months.
5.2 Estimation Method
The foregoing discussion suggests a straightforward, albeit nonlinear, least-squares
procedure for estimation. This is to choose as estimates the values of the unknown
parameters that minimize the difference between the observed and expected annual
consumption outcomes. Unfortunately, with a ﬁnite sample of data the variance pa-
rameters in (10) tend to be poorly identiﬁed on the basis of the conditional expectation
of demand alone. This is because, for some realizations of the data, the conditional ex-
pectation function (6) may be nearly ﬂat with respect to  in a broad region containing
the true value of this parameter. In essence the ﬁrst moments of the sample may con-
tain too little information to estimate the variance of the stochastic term accurately,
absent an impractically large sample.
To resolve this problem, it is necessary to incorporate information on the higher
moments of the model into estimation. We employ a generalized method of moments
(GMM) procedure based on the ﬁrst and second moments of annual consumption, us-
ing the following technique. Let hr(W;)=E[(xa)
rjW] denote the r-th conditional
moment of annual consumption. Here  denotes the set of unknown parameters to
be estimated, and W = fw1;w 2;:::;w 12g is the set of all observable variables inﬂu-
encing the household’s annual consumption. We base inference on a pair of ﬁrst- and
second-moment differences between observed and expected annual consumption:
u1 = xa − h1(W;)
u2 =( xa)
2 − h2(W;) − 2h1(W;)(xa − h1(W;)) :
some redundancy involved, the task of evaluating such a likelihood function (for use in either direct or
simulated likelihood methods) appears quite burdensome.
15By construction, both u1 andu2 have conditionalmean zero given W. Thecross-product
term in the second equation, −2h1(xa − h1), is added to improve the sampling perfor-
mance of the estimator: if (xa)2 >h 2 then the cross-product term tends to be negative,
and conversely if (xa)2 <h 2, which reduces the sampling variance of u2. The second
equation amounts to basing inference on the centered, rather than uncentered, second
moment of annual consumption.
The functional form of h1(W;) is given by (11) and (6). The functional form of
h2(W;) is derived similarly, and involves the second moment of the truncated normal
distribution. In doing so, an additional complication arises due to the temporal aggre-
gation of monthly consumption outcomes. While computing h1 involves only the mean
and variance of the stochastic term " in the underlying demand speciﬁcation, evaluat-
ing h2 requires an assumption about the correlation of " over time. We assume that
the value of " in the household’s demand speciﬁcation (9) is independent from month
to month. This simpliﬁcation is motivated by computational concerns, as an autocor-
relation structure for the unobservables is likely to be difﬁcult to identify with annual
consumption data.
From the conditional moment differences u1 and u2, we construct orthogonality con-
ditions for GMM in a standard manner. By classical arguments, optimal instruments
in this setting involve (covariance-weighted) derivatives of the conditional moments h1
and h2. We use the gradients of the ﬁrst and second conditional moments, setting








Here  denotes the demand parameters from (9) and  a vector of the variance terms
from (10), with  =( ;). The unconditional orthogonality conditions are then E[z0
rur]=
0, r =1 ;2: This instrument set yields m =2 dim()+d i m ( ) moment equations for
estimation and dim() over-identifying restrictions.13 Note that the gradient of h1 with
respect to the variance parameters is excluded from the instruments, for the sample
analog contains no useful information (it is essentially singular if incorporated into
estimation—this is the reason the variance parameters are poorly identiﬁed by non-
linear least squares estimation using the ﬁrst moments alone).
13It may be veriﬁed by direct analysis that these instruments preserve a unique solution for  to the
m equations E[z
0
rur]=0 , r =1 ;2; provided that the household variance function (d1;d 2;:::;d K)
2 is
bounded away from zero.
16Our estimator minimizes the usual GMM distance metric jjAu()jj2,w h e r eA is an






is the 2n-vector of ‘stacked’ ﬁrst and second conditional moment differences for all n
households. The matrix A = ~ R ~ Z0D,w h e r eD is a diagonal matrix containing the
appropriate survey sampling weight for each observation, ~ Z is the (2n  m) matrix
of instruments evaluated at an initial consistent estimate of , and ~ R is the (up-
per) Cholesky factor of an approximation to the inverse moment covariance matrix.
Speciﬁcally, ~ R0 ~ R =[ D ~ Z0~ Ω ~ ZD]−1,w h e r e~ Ω is an estimate of the covariance matrix
Ω=E[u()u()0jW]. Under the model, the matrix Ω is known up to the parameters 
and has a simple tri-diagonal form. In particular, the non-zero elements are the sec-
ond through fourth conditional moments of annual consumption. We calculate these
higher moments analytically (as a function of the parameters), and then evaluate Ω at
an initial consistent estimate of  to obtain ~ Ω.
To obtain ﬁnal parameter estimates, we iterated minimization of the GMM dis-
tance metric ﬁve times using successive updates of the matrix A.14 Full optimization
required approximately six minutes on a 450 MHz computer, with m = 270 moment
equations and 212 estimated parameters. Numerical optimization was performed us-
ing a modiﬁed Gauss-Newton algorithm based on trust-region subspace minimization,
and implemented in Matlab.15
6 Data and Empirical Speciﬁcations
We estimate the model using data from the Residential Energy Consumption Survey
(RECS). The RECS is conducted every three to four years by the U.S. Department of
Energy to collect information on household appliances and energy use. The survey
is a nationally representative probability sample of households, with representative
subsamples for several large states. We use the California subsamples of the 1993
and 1997 survey waves, which are the most recent available. Together they provide
information on 1,307 California households.16
The survey is conducted by in-home interview. Interviewers inventory the house-
14The ﬁrst-round estimate of  provides the initial consistent estimate.
15For discussion of recent trust-region optimization methods, see Nocedal and Wright (1999).
16The RECS sample design mirrors that of the U.S. Consumer Population Survey. There is no longitu-
dinal component to the 1993 and 1997 RECS.
17hold’s appliances, assess physical characteristics of the residence, and collect demo-
graphic information. The survey also includes weather data (heating and cooling
degree-days) for each household, which are obtained from the nearest National Weather
Service (NWS) station during the survey year. To minimize measurement error, each
household’s metered energy consumption is collected directly from the household’s en-
ergy supplier. The household survey response rate is 81 percent, and the subsequent
supplier survey response rate is over 90 percent.17
The appliance information, representativeness, and quality of the consumption
data make the RECS particularlyvaluablefor analyzinghousehold electricity demand.
There are, however, two noteworthy shortcomings of the RECS data. The ﬁrst is that
the RECS public-use ﬁles only provide annual household electricity consumption and
expenditures. This poses problems for relating consumption to monthly prices, and
motivated our efforts to address temporal aggregation in Section 5.1.
The second shortcoming pertains to the limited electricity tariff information avail-
able in the survey. Inadequate pricing data are a ﬁrst-order problem for many previous
studies of electricity demand and for other researchers using the RECS. Our consider-
able efforts to rectify this problem merit a brief digression here.
6.1 Prices
During the sample period most California households faced an increasing two-tier
electricity price schedule each month, such as the one depicted in Figure 1. These
schedules vary by service provider, climate zone, household heating system, household
income, and season. For example, the state’s largest utility, Paciﬁc Gas and Electric
(PG&E), offers residential service rate schedules that differ in summer and winter
months, by whether the household has permanently-installed electric heat or not, by
whether the household is designated as low-income or not, and in which of nine climate
zones the household resides. Thus, PG&E had 72 (= 2229) standard residential
rate schedules in effect during 1993, and again (with different tariffs) in 1997. A simi-
larly complex structure applies to other major utilities.18
The RECS data provide two summary price measures for each household. The ﬁrst
is the household’s annual average electricity price, in cents per kilowatt-hour. The
second is the local electric utility’s annual average revenue per KWh sold to all its res-
idential customers. Either of these price measures unfortunately presents problems
17Detailed information about the RECS data and survey design is available in EIA (1994, 1996).
18There are also special rate schedules for households with medical equipment, utility employees, and
families living in trailer parks. There are sufﬁciently few households on these rates that we have ignored
these schedules on probabilistic grounds.
18for modeling electricity demand at a disaggregate (household) level. Since electric-
ity rates increase with monthly consumption, the ﬁrst of these two price measures
is endogenous (it rises with consumption) and bears a complex relation to the house-
hold’s monthly use. The second, utility-level average price, while putatively exogenous,
will typically mis-measure the marginal price faced by a household. Thus, either sum-
mary price measure could be expected to provide poor information regarding the actual
(marginal) price facing the household each month.19
To address these shortcomings, we developed a procedure for matching each obser-
vation in the RECS with the complete rate schedule facing the household. The data
this requires that are not provided in the RECS are each household’s utility and its
utility-designated climate zone. To determine these, we exploit three types of informa-
tion in the RECS about the household: the local utility’s average electricity price, the
availability and price of natural gas, and the weather information. The weather data
provide considerable information regarding where in California’sdiverse climate zones
each household is located. The electricity and natural gas price data help pinpoint the
household’s service provider.20
We use a discriminant procedure to match each RECS household to its utility ser-
vice provider and climate zone. First, we used maps of utility service areas to assign
each of the approximately 240 National Weather Service (NWS) stations in California
to one (or two adjacent) utility service territories. We also collected the local aver-
age electricity and gas prices for each service territory in the state. These weather
and price data are the same primary data series accessed by the RECS designers and
included with each household in the survey.21 Our algorithm then determines each
household’s utility and climate zone based on how well the household’s information in
the RECS matches the known average price and weather information for each utility
and NWS station in California.
19By standard econometric arguments, we expect estimated price elasticities based on such measures
to be biased downward in this setting. There is an additional problem with the RECS’ utility-level price
measure, in that the ﬁrm that conducts the survey introduces a small amount of measurement error into
this price for conﬁdentiality reasons.
20An example may help. Palo Alto, a city on the San Francisco Bay, has its own municipal utility that
charged between 5 and 6 cents per KWh during our sample period. Palo Alto is surrounded by PG&E’s
service territory, which includes neighboring cities such as Mountain View that have similar weather.
What distinguishes a household served by the City of Palo Alto from one served by PG&E in Mountain
View in the data is that Mountain View residents’ electricity prices are more than twice as high.
21For example, the RECS assignsﬁve heatingandthree coolingdegree-day measures to each household,
by locating the nearest “representative” NWS station. We use the same eight degree-day series (for all
240 California NWS stations) to determine the household’s nearby NWS station. As with the price data,
the RECS introduces a small amount of noise into the weather data so that the match is not quite perfect.
The primary sources for local utility average electricity and gas prices are FERC Form 1, US Department
of Energy Form EIA-861 and Form EIA-412.
19With each RECS household matched to its utility and climate zone, the remaining
information necessary to determine a household’s applicable rate schedule (viz., the
household’s income and its home heating system) are directly availablein the survey.22
To complete the procedure, we manually constructed the complete 1993 and 1997 elec-
tricity tariff books for each California utility, from ﬁlings archived at the California
Public Utilities Commission public records library and direct contact with municipal
utilities’ tariff departments. In the end, the 1,307 California households in the RECS
sample were matched to 189 distinct rate schedules.
To provide some information on how well this matching procedure performs, Table
1 lists the major electric service providers in California along with their average resi-
dential rate and number of residential customers in 1993. As the survey is a stratiﬁed
probability sample of California households, we expect (and ﬁnd) reasonable agree-
ment between what the utilities report as their number of residential accounts and
the number of households implied by the survey.23 The top and bottom panels of Table
1 divide the state’s electric service providers into investor-owned utilities and munici-
pal (or other public) utilities. The table reveals that the implied distribution of RECS
households by electric service provider is quite close to that reported separately for
the larger utilities. The most notable deviations occur for the two smallest investor-
owned utilities, Sierra Paciﬁc and PaciﬁCorp. Both of these utilities serve areas in the
mountainous northern and eastern (respectively) areas of the state, have relatively low
electricity prices, and minimal natural gas service. We believe that the stratiﬁcation
design and a special segment of the RECS that oversamples low-income households
may account for their over-representation.24
6.2 Appliance Demand Speciﬁcations
Our monthly appliance demand speciﬁcations are based on prior empirical research
that has studied households’ appliance use decisions. Principal sources are the EPRI/-
REEPS model described in LBL (1995) and the EIA Residential End-Use Model, EIA
(1995). We model end-use electricity demand using eight distinct appliance categories:
1. Baseline electricity use;
22We also used the RECS’ electricity expenditure data to determine which eligible low-income house-
holds are actually participating in their utilities’ low-income electricity tariff programs.
23An unresolved issue is the RECS sampling weights imply 350,000 more California households with
electricity service than comparable ﬁgures in California utilities’ regulatory accounting data. This is
evident in the bottom line of Table 1.
24The survey’s cluster sampling procedure has a countervailing effect, which is to reduce the survey’s
coverage of smaller utility service areas. We are grateful to U.S. Energy Information Administration
analysts for discussions on these RECS sampling design issues.
202. Electric space heating;
3. Central air conditioning;
4. Room air conditioning;
5. Electric water heating;
6. Swimming pools;
7. Additional refrigerators and freezers; and
8. Other appliances.
The baseline category accounts for the electricity consumption of appliances that are
universally owned, such as the (ﬁrst) refrigerator and lights.25 This category also
implicitly includes consumption attributable to any unspeciﬁed electrical appliances
below the resolution of the RECS survey (such as electric clocks, irons, hair dryers,
and the like). Appliance categories two through six are energy-intensive end uses that
previous research indicates exhibit some utilization price elasticity (EPRI (1989)). The
ﬁnal category includes less-energy-intensive household appliances. A description of all
appliances entering the model is provided in Table 2A.
Different factors are assumed to inﬂuence appliance-level electricity demand in
each category. In particular, we estimate separate price and income effects for each
of the ﬁrst six categories. The remaining appliances are assumed to exhibit a com-
mon price effect, as previous studies indicate most of these (refrigeration, cooking,
clothes dryers, etcetera) exhibit no signiﬁcant electricity price elasticity. Demographic
and other explanatory variables entering the model are deﬁned in Table 2B. Demo-
graphic characteristics of households are assumed constant during the survey year;
the monthly-varying covariates in our speciﬁcations are the price schedules and the
weather data.26 All monetary variables are normalized to real (June 1993) prices, us-
ing the CPI-U series for California’s three consolidated metropolitan statistical areas.
25Because lights and a (ﬁrst) refrigerator are owned by all households in our sample, their mean elec-
tricity consumption cannot be separately identiﬁed by the model.
26In addition to the speciﬁcations evident in Table 3 below, we imposed a constraint that electricity
consumption for space heating and cooling is zero during the summer and winter months, respectively.
To accommodate the varied heating and cooling season lengths for different regions and elevations in
California, this was implemented via a minimum (one per day) degree-day threshold for the use of these
appliances.
217 Results and Implications
7.1 Estimates and Marginal Effects
The electricity demand coefﬁcients estimated with the generalized method-of-moments
technique are shown in Table 3. The table is organized so that each column contains
the parameter estimates associated with an appliance category’s electricity demand.
The mean square error of the estimated model is 2,352 KWh/year2, which is approxi-
mately one-third of the sample variance in annual consumption. The chi-square statis-
tic for Hansen’s asymptotic test of the over-identifying restrictions is 76.9; a value this
large is unlikely under the model with simple random sampling (d.f.=58, p=0.05).27
Since the conditional expectation function estimated by the GMM procedure is non-
linear in the parameters, it is difﬁcult to interpret the numerical estimates in Table 3
directly. Table 4 converts these estimates into marginal effects for the principal vari-
ables in the model. Table entries show the marginal effect of a one unit increase in
each explanatory factor on monthly kilowatt-hour consumption of each speciﬁed ap-
pliance. We compute marginal effects separately for each household (as the gradient
of the conditional expectation function (6) with respect to the explanatory variables),
and then average across households using the RECS sampling weights. The marginal
effects shown are interpretable as estimated population means for California house-
holds, conditional on ownership of the indicated appliance.
The signs and magnitudes of the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 generally agree with
prior studies, although there are a few exceptions.28 Since our primary interest lies
in assessing the effects of price changes on electricity consumption, our comments
below focus on the marginal price and income effects and their demand elasticities.
Both Tables 3 and 4 indicate that the estimated price effects vary substantially across
appliances. The smallest effect is associated with baseline use, and is effectively zero.
All other appliance price sensitivities are of considerable practical signiﬁcance. For
example, the −27.5 estimate for price and swimming pools in Table 4 implies that a
one cent per KWh increase in the marginal price would reduce a household’s annual
utilizationof pool pumps and motors by approximately 330KWh per year, which is 15%
27Since the RECS uses a complex multi-stage sampling design, the true critical values for this statistic
are likely to be larger than their standard asymptotic approximations. As actual critical values are
difﬁcult to ascertain for this design, we consider a different approach to model validation below in Section
7.4.
28Exceptions are the negative coefﬁcients on income and on the number of rooms in the water heating
speciﬁcation. We suspect this may be due to confounding from unobserved variation in water heater
energy efﬁciency, which is likely to be considerably higher in newer (larger) homes in California. The
negative coefﬁcients on the number of household members and space cooling are also of unexpected sign,
and may be attributable to an omitted (positive) inﬂuence of householder age on space cooling demand.
22of a pool’s typical electricity use. The price effects for major appliances providing space
heating, cooling, and water heating services differ from one another considerably, both
in absolute terms and relative to typical consumption for each appliance (see Table 7).
By contrast, the income effects are mostly statistically insigniﬁcant and negligible
as a practical matter. This is not entirely surprising, given that our analysis is con-
ditional on households’ appliance stocks. To the extent that income affects electricity
consumption, it is evidently manifest through households’ choices of appliances rather
than through utilization behavior. These results are consistent with prior studies’ ﬁnd-
ings of low-to-negligible appliance utilization income elasticities at the household level
(e.g., Parti and Parti (1980) and Dubin and McFadden (1984)).
The estimated demand model also includes 154 variance and covariance param-
eters (from equation (10)) that we do not report here.29 Our estimates suggest that
the variance of household-level unobservable characteristics increases with appliance
holdings, although it depends (in a complicated fashion) on the types of appliances
owned by the household. For instance, the estimated standard deviation of the stochas-
tic term for baseline electricity consumption (i.e., electricity for the ﬁrst refrigerator,
lights, etc.) is 387 KWh per month (SE=22 KWh/month). If the household’s dwelling
has electric space heating, the household-level stochastic term has a higher standard
deviation of 479 KWh per month (SE=92 KWh/month); if we further add central air
conditioning and an electric stove or oven to the household’s appliance portfolio, it
increases to 590 KWh per month (SE=103 KWh/month). Overall, the standard devi-
ations for the unobservable components of household electricity demand vary widely
across households with different appliance portfolios. This reﬂects—in large part—the
enormous differences in maximum potential energy consumption for households with
different types of appliances.
7.2 Price Elasticities
Table 5 presents estimated average annual household price and income elasticities.
These elasticity estimates correspond to the percent change in a household’s annual
electricity consumption resulting from a one percent increase in the marginal price
(or household income) in each month of the year, holding the appliance stock ﬁxed.
We calculate demand elasticities separately for each of the 1,307 households in the
sample, and then average across households using the RECS sampling weights. The
29In estimation we use a re-parameterization of the variance function (10) that facilitates estimation
but at the cost of increasingthe number of parameters. Estimation is easier because the re-parameterized
GMM objective function is orthogonal in each of the 154 variance parameters. This re-parameterization
imposes positive deﬁniteness but otherwise places no restrictions on the covariance matrix in (10).
23elasticity estimates shown in Table 5 are thus interpretable as estimated population
means for California households.
Before interpreting these numbers, it is important to note that with non-linear tar-
iffs there is more than one “price” involved in measuring the elasticity of demand. For
example, one can calculate the elasticity of demand with respect to an increase in the
intercept of the price schedule, with respect to the price of a speciﬁc tariff tier, or with
respect to the consumer’s actual marginal price. We present elasticity estimates based
on the third of these interpretations, so as to reﬂect households’ demand sensitivity on
the margin. In doing so we recognize the fact that with multi-part tariffs, changing
a consumer’s marginal price may alter consumption within the current tariff segment
or induce a discrete jump to a different price tier. Our elasticity calculations explicitly
account for this possibility, using the method described in Appendix A.
We estimate the mean annual electricity price elasticity for California households
to be −0.39. Previous studies of residential electricity demand data have estimated
widely varying utilization price elasticities, ranging from nearly zero to about −0.6.
These estimates reﬂect differences in the geographic regions examined, as well as
considerable variation in data types and statistical techniques. Studies conducted by
electric utilities, which often have higher-quality data, tend to obtain price elastici-
ties within a narrower range of −0.15 to −0.35 (EPRI (1989)). Our results with the
California RECS data fall at this set’s upper end, but are close to the −0.35 estimate
contained in a much earlier Rand Corporation study of Los Angeles-area households
by Acton, Bridger and Howill (1976).
It is interesting to compare our estimates to those obtained for the same households
using more traditional estimation methods. If in place of the complete rate schedule
we instead use either of the two average price measures available in the RECS, we
obtain uniformly smaller (in magnitude) elasticities. Table 5 includes elasticity es-
timates obtained using OLS with the (statistically exogenous) utility-level average
price measure in the RECS; the OLS-based mean household price elasticity is −.28.
Similar regressions that incorporate alternative measures of households’ rate sched-
ules appearing in the literature (e.g., using the midpoint of the two tiers or the ﬁnal
tier price) also yield smaller price elasticities. These results are consistent with the
downward biases one would expect due to the price mis-speciﬁcation and self-selection
problems noted earlier. It also suggests an explanation for why our GMM estimates
imply somewhat more price-elastic behavior than many earlier studies’ (particularly
the utility-conducted studies noted above), in that most of the prior literature handles
24these tariff schedule complexities in either an ad hoc manner or not at all.30
Heterogeneity in Price Sensitivity
While we report single overall price and income elasticities in Table 6, these population
means obscure considerable and meaningful heterogeneity in households’ price and in-
come elasticities. As noted previously, the model includes separate price and income
terms for major appliances. These terms permit households’ price and income elastici-
ties to vary across households not just with their consumption level, but also with their
appliance holdings. The remaining rows of Table 5 illustrate the marked differences in
estimated demand elasticities for households with different heating and cooling sys-
tems. Households with electric space heating or air conditioning exhibit a much higher
electricity price elasticity than households without such systems. Households that do
not use electricity for either of these purposes have an estimated mean price elasticity
very close to zero. This heterogeneity is consistent with the limited prior evidence on
electricity price elasticity variation across households (e.g., Dubin (1985)). As a practi-
cal matter, it suggests that there are effectively two ‘types’ of households with respect
to electricity demand behavior: those who use electricity for space heating or air con-
ditioning and exhibit some electricity price elasticity, and those who do not and are
evidently price insensitive.
Further information about the heterogeneity in households’ demand elasticities
is provided in Figure 2. This ﬁgure presents a histogram of the sample households’
price elasticities, weighted to estimate the distribution for the California population.
Each of the rectangles to the left of the origin represents three percent of California
households (e.g., three percent of households have a price elasticity between −0.82
and −0.91). The point-mass at zero indicates that 44 percent of California households
exhibit no short-run demand sensitivity to changes in the marginal price of electricity.
This segment of the population are households that own no major electric appliances
other than a refrigerator, and whose minor appliances fall withinthe inelastic ‘baseline
use’ category of the model.
Figure 2 brings into focus the substantial heterogeneity in households’ price sensi-
tivities. The striking feature of this distribution is its asymmetric, negatively skewed
form. This pattern indicates that most households will alter their electricity consump-
30It is also worth noting that in electricity markets, seemingly small differences in price elasticities
are economically quite signiﬁcant (viz., Table 5’s −0.28 using OLS versus −0.39 using complete rate
schedules). Assuming a price elasticity that is too small by this difference of −0.1 when increasing
rates by (say) three cents per KWh would overestimate annual revenue for California’s larger utilities by
approximately one hundred million dollars.
25tion very little in response to a price change. A small fraction of households, however,
are actually elastic demanders (roughly 1 in every 8 families) and would react with
large changes in their electricity use. This has noteworthy implications for the welfare
effects of electricity price changes, inasmuch as most of the welfare losses from a price
increase would evidently be borne by a fairly small share of the consumer population.
Where a household is located in the elasticity distribution is also related to house-
hold income and other demographic characteristics. To explore this, Table 6 sum-
marizes household electricity price elasticities by household income and consumption
levels. How price elasticities vary with household income (in the cross-section) is of in-
terest because regulatory commissions provide subsidized tariffs to low-income house-
holds, and are at times concerned with the consumption incentives of these subsidies.
The conventional wisdom is that households with lower incomes are more sensitive to
energy prices than households with medium-to-high incomes. The results in the top
half of Table 6 are quite consistent with this view, although the magnitudes of the
differences across income quartiles are not dramatic.
The lower half of Table 6 indicates how household price elasticities vary with the
amount of electricity the household consumes. This relationship is of interest because
the aggregate consumption and revenue effects of a tariff change depend upon how
elasticities vary across the different tiers of the price schedule. Somewhat surprisingly,
we ﬁnd that elasticities are lower for households that use high amounts of electricity,
despite the fact that households with energy-intensive electric space heating/cooling
systems have much greater electricity price sensitivity ceteris paribus. This inverse
relationship reﬂects both a weak correlation between household income and owner-
ship of electric space heating/cooling systems, and the fact that households apparently
substitute toward more price-inelastic electricity uses as income rises. Thus, from an
economic efﬁciency standpoint, the welfare cost of raising a given amount of revenue
will be minimized if the marginal price changes are disproportionately larger for the
highest-demand consumers.
7.3 Appliance Consumption Estimates
Recall that the estimated model treats total household electricity consumption as the
aggregation of individual appliance utilization decisions. A useful feature of this ap-
proach is that the ﬁtted model provides estimates of the electricity consumed by each
appliance. These appliance-level consumption estimates are of direct interest to en-
ergy analysts, and provide a useful benchmark for the model since they can be com-
pared to independent estimates of typical appliance energy consumption.
Table 7 provides the model’s predictions about how annual electricity consumption
26varies by appliance. The ﬁrst numerical column in Table 7 reports the estimated pro-
portion of California households that own particular appliances, based on a weighted
average of 1993 and 1997 sample ownership frequencies in the RECS. The second col-
umn reports the model’s prediction for the average annual electricity consumption of
each appliance. These estimates are obtained as the predicted values from the ﬁtted
appliance demand equations (7). The appliance consumption estimates are averaged
across households (using the RECS sampling weights) so as to reﬂect typical values in
the population of appliance owners.
Comparable appliance-level consumption estimates from prior studies are also listed
in Table 7. The third column contains appliance energy consumption predictions from
a model developed by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA (1995)).31 The
ﬁnal column is from a Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL (1997)) meta-analysis of
numerous residential appliance energy consumption estimates. These estimates are
derived from a wide range of direct metering, engineering, and statistical studies of
energy use in different areas of the U.S. Overall, there is general agreement between
these prior studies and the model’s results—perhaps surprisingly so, since the present
model is not ﬁt to utilization data for individual appliances. The principal important
anomaly occurs with heating, where the LBL survey reports a signiﬁcantly higher
number than we or the EIA do. This can in part be explained by the broader geo-
graphic coverage of the LBL analysis and the high sensitivity of heating energy use to
climate differences.
7.4 Household-level Consumption and Sampling Considerations
In the foregoing discussion, we have interpreted many of the econometric results (for a
sample of 1,307 households) as estimates of the corresponding values for a population
of approximately 11 million households. This interpretation rests on the fact that the
RECS sampling design is intended to produce a representative probability sample of
California households. As a caveat to the discussion (and for purposes of interpret-
ing an out-of-sample test, below) it is useful to examine the representativeness of the
RECS consumption data and model predictions directly.
Because electric utilities are subject to extensive regulatory reporting requirements,
there exist comprehensive aggregate data on utilities’ actual sales and number of cus-
tomers. In principle, averages from these data will differ from their counterparts for
the RECS households by amounts attributable to the survey’s sampling error. Some
31This results published by EIA (1995) are based (indirectly) on the same survey data as the present
model, so that the EIA (1995) appliance-level consumption ﬁgures should not be considered wholly inde-
pendent estimates.
27evidence on this issue is provided in Table 8. The ﬁrst numerical column in Table
8 presents a weighted average of 1993 and 1997 actual electricity consumption per
household for California’s four largest utilities and for the state as a whole.32 The
second column presents the corresponding mean electricity consumption for the RECS
sample households along with the standard error of the survey.
Comparing the averages for the state as a whole in the bottom row of Table 8, we
see that the RECS understates actual average consumption by slightly more than two
standard errors. The 1993 and 1997 RECS samples thus appear to under-represent
California household electricity consumption. We also ﬁnd that the RECS data un-
derstate average household consumption for each of the state’s four largest utilities,
although by sometimes less that two standard errors.33 Overall, there is some question
as to how representative the RECS is of average household consumption in California.
It is also interesting to compare the model’s predictions to the actual and sample
consumption averages. Since the model is ﬁt to the RECS data, the difference between
the RECS and model averages represents within-sample error. Although the model is
nonlinear, the average within-sample error for the full sample is essentially zero. As
with the raw sample data, however, the estimated model displays a similar pattern
of under-predicting actual consumption for each utility and the state overall. This
is not entirely surprising, given that the model can at best capture the behavior of
the sample to which it is ﬁt. We conclude that while the RECS sample appears to
understate actual household consumption in California, the model does reasonably
well (i.e., within a few percent) at ﬁtting the sample data for each utility.
7.5 An Out-of-Sample Robustness Test
The validity of the empirical results rest, in part, on the appliance demand speciﬁca-
tions and error distribution assumptions of the model. Because we must aggregate
over appliances and over time to match the consumption level of the data, these ap-
pliance demand speciﬁcations are not testable directly. We have already reported the
result of a general speciﬁcation test based on the over-identifying restrictions of the
model. A more compelling test, however, is to compare the performance of the model
32Actual average consumption data were obtained from U.S. Department of Energy Form EIA-861 for
calendar years 1993 and 1997. These data include all 46 providers of retail electric service in California.
33There are two additional reasons why the utility-speciﬁc averages might differ. First, while the RECS
is designed to generate a representative sample of households at the state level, the sampling scheme
is not designed to produce representative samples within each utility’s service territory. Second, the
household-utility matching procedure we use to obtain rate schedules (as described in Section 6.1) intro-
duces potential mis-classiﬁcation error. The difference in state-level average consumption between the
RECS and the EIA-861 data is not subject to these caveats.
28out-of-sample with actual consumption outcomes made at different prices.
In January1998, shortly after the end of our sample data, California’s three largest
investor-owned utilities reduced the price of residential electric service by ten percent.
This price change, by virtue of its magnitude and exogeneity to the household, provides
a unique opportunity to evaluate the model’s out-of-sample accuracy. In addition, 1998
and 1999 were years of the El Ni˜ no weather disturbance, which led to substantial
changes in California’s weather conditions relative to prior years.34
Ideally, we would prefer to evaluate the model using within-household differences
in predicted and actual consumption between 1997 and 1998 (i.e., a matched-pair test).
Unfortunately, due to the triennial (and non-longitudinal) nature of the RECS, we do
not have data on actual consumption after 1997 for the sample households. Instead,
we can base inference on comparisons to aggregate consumption data reported by Cal-
ifornia’s individual utilities for 1998 and 1999.
To implement a formal test we ﬁrst extended the weather series used in the model
through 1999, for each RECS household. We also collected the exact form of the tariff
changes implemented in 1998 and 1999 for each RECS household.35 We then use
the model to predict what the RECS households would have done in 1998 and 1999,
given the price change and weather conditions that actually occurred. We aggregate
their responses and, relying on the representativeness of the RECS sample, obtain the
model’s predictions of what should have happened at the utility level.
Table 9 compares these out-of-sample predictions to actual residential electricity
consumption for California’s four largest utilities in 1998 and 1999. The second-to-
last column provides estimated standard errors for the difference between the actual
and predicted consumption averages. These standard errors account for both the non-
sampling variance in future consumption outcomes under the model, and the sampling
error associated with the RECS multi-stage design.36 The ﬁnal column reports the
(two-sided) probability of observing a difference at least as large as that shown, under
the maintained assumptions of the model. Small p-values constitute evidence against
34This major weather phenomenon confounds direct causal interpretation of changes in aggregate Cal-
ifornia electricity consumption between 1997 and 1998–99.
35The January 1998 price decrease amounted to lowering each tier of the household’s price schedule by
ten percent. The actual marginal price change thus depends upon the household’s particular rate sched-
ule. There was also a separate price increase for households served by the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power in 1999, which shows up as a notable decline in both actual and predicted consumption
for Los Angeles households between 1998 and 1999.
36Since we have a nonlinear model and the RECS uses a complex design, the standard errors for this
test are inexact. We use a linear approximation (delta) method to estimate the variance of average
predicted consumption under simple (1/n) random sampling, and then inﬂate the result by the design
efﬁciency ratio of the RECS consumption series (about 1.4) to get the standard errors in Table 9. This
method and related techniques are discussed in Skinner, Holt, and Smith (1989).
29the validity of the model.
As the ﬁndings in Section 7.3 foreshadowed, the model continues to under-predict
average consumption in 1998 and 1999. For three of the four utilities in each panel,
however, the observed differences from the model’s predictions are within the bounds
of what may be ascribed to chance by conventional standards of statistical signiﬁcance.
The smallest p-values, for Paciﬁc Gas and Electric in 1998 and 1999, are attributable
to the particularly acute under-representativeness (relative to sampling error) of the
RECS households’ consumption data for this utility. Interestingly, for three of the four
utilities in each panel, the model’s average error (relative to actual) is smaller for the
out-of-sample years of 1998 and 1999 than it is for the within-sample years reported
in Table 8. On that basis, the model appears to deliver reasonable predictions for how
California households’ respond to electricity price changes. The under-prediction of
consumption remains a concern with these data, however.
8 Analyzing Tariff Structure Changes
We now turn from estimation of demand behavior to prediction. One motivation for
the model developed in this paper is that it can be used to evaluate, on a prospective
basis, the effects of complex rate schedule changes. For a variety of practical reasons,
regulatory agencies are often reluctant to authorize randomized-assignment pricing
experiments as a means to evaluate major tariff changes. Thus, counter-factual sim-
ulations based on econometric models become the analytic method of choice. The ac-
curacy of these simulations is a matter of considerable practical interest, inasmuch as
tariff changes for electricity can affect billions of dollars in consumer expenditures.
In this section, we illustrate how the estimated demand model can be used to eval-
uate the consumption and expenditure effects of a new tariff design. For the sake of
concreteness, we consider a speciﬁc new system for electricity pricing in California.
Following a ﬁnancial crisis facing that state’s utilities in the spring of 2001, the Cal-
ifornia Public Utilities Commission approved new tariff structures for the state’s two
largest utilities. The new multi-part tariff structure for residential electric service is
shown graphically in Figure 3. Under this ﬁve-tier design, the household inherits from
its prior (two-tier) tariff a monthly reference quantity,  x: The ﬁrst  x kilowatt-hours of
monthly electricity consumption are then billed at one price per kilowatt-hour, the
next 30%   x are billed at a higher price, and so forth as indicated in Figure 3. The
reference quantity  x and the speciﬁc tier prices vary based on the utility, the season,
the household’s climate zone and home heating system, and other factors.
This novel pricing system is intended to achieve several objectives. First and fore-
30most is to raise additional revenue for the state’s utilities: As Figure 3 indicates, the
household’s new price schedule lies everywhere above the prior schedule it replaces.
Second, the new tariff is intended to promote energy conservation, particularly among
higher-demand consumers. Third, there is a distributive objective underlying this tar-
iff design. Electricity is a necessary good (in the sense that its budget share declines
as household income rises), so a uniform increase in price of electricity can be quite re-
gressive. By raising marginal prices more for higher levels of consumption, regulatory
authorities hope to attenuate this regressivity and minimize expenditure changes for
lower-income households.
Evaluating how well this new tariff system achieves these objectives is a difﬁcult
task. Because the ﬁve-part tariff is unprecedented in historical consumption data,
there is no way to extrapolate its effects using descriptive (i.e., reduced-form) econo-
metric methods. Rather, predicting aggregate demand requires modeling consumer
choice behavior under the new tariffs. Such models require household-level data in or-
der to account for consumer heterogeneity and the myriad nonlinear price schedules.
Our basic task is to use the disaggregate information on consumers’ price sensitiv-
ities from the econometric model to predict, household by household, the change in
consumption and expenditures under the new price schedule.
There is a complication in carrying out this type of micro-simulation analysis, how-
ever. Empirical demand models based on economic theory are formulated assuming
the consumer faces a constant marginal price. The econometric model estimated above
is no exception to this (see again the discussion following (9)). Some additional effort
is therefore required to obtain an econometric model’s predictions under alternative
supply conditions.
The analysis in Sections 2 and 3 provides one way to do this. To be precise, suppose
j indexes the ﬁve tiers, pj is the marginal price on tier j, and  xj is the jth-tier upper
boundary. For convenience, let yj denote the household’s income plus the cumulative
rate structure discount applicable in tier j, and set xj = x(pj;y j;z;): If we let w be
the set of observable household characteristics entering the econometric model, then








P( xj − xj <"< xj − xj+1)   xj (12)
using the conventions  x0 =0 ,  x5 = 1.H e r e P is the distribution of " given w, and
31all expectations are with respect to this distribution. The ﬁrst sum on the right-hand
side is the contribution to expected consumption conditional on demand crossing the
price schedule on one the ﬁve steps, and the second sum is the contribution conditional
on demand crossing the price schedule in one of the ‘gaps’ between the steps. As be-
fore, this amounts to a probability-weighted average of expected demand within each
segment of the new tariff schedule.
Equation (12) is a generalization of the expected two-tier consumption equation
(5) derived in Section 3. As in that case, one can interpret (12) in terms of a supply
and demand equilibrium at the household level. Speciﬁcally, it gives the (expected)
solution to intersecting the consumer’s demand function (under a constant marginal
price) and the new multi-part price schedule in Figure 3. In this way, this prediction
equation accounts for the complicated interdependence of the household’s marginal
tariff segment and the expected consumption level within that segment.
Several other aspects of (12) are worth noting. Its central feature is that it explicitly
incorporates the complete structure of the new price schedule. This allows one to
address, for example, how consumption or expenditures would differ with a change
in speciﬁc tier prices or the tariff-step reference quantities. A new tariff structure
different from that in Figure 3 would of course require a different prediction equation,
but the generalization is by now straightforward.
The probabilistic terms appearing in (12) are present to account for the effect of
unobservable sources of variation in households’ energy use. These variations must be
incorporated explicitly in order to ensure that the new marginalprice and consumption
level are internally consistent. Stated in behavioral terms, the consumer sorting-on-
the-unobservables problem that occurs with multi-part tariffs must be addressed not
only in demand estimation but also when predicting consumption at new prices.37
Evaluating (12) requires measures of the household’s sensitivity to changes in its
marginal price, income, and other factors inﬂuencing demand. These attributes en-
ter xj = x(pj;y j;z;), and affect the tariff tier selection probabilities. This yields an
inherently nonlinear relationship between a household’s consumption outcome and
the household’s price elasticity. Such nonlinearities are why the aggregate impacts of
a new tariff design depend upon the cross-sectional distribution of consumers’ price
elasticities.
37For example, equation (12) differs from what one obtains by simply intersecting the household’s esti-
mated demand curve (thatis, assuming" to be zero) and the new price schedule. Thattechnique implicitly
treats the tariff segment selection probabilities in (12) as either zero or one, and ignores the conditional
expectation term for " on the predicted tariff segment. Unless the variance in the household’s future
consumption given the observables is in fact zero—in practice an unlikely circumstance—the technique
will systematically mis-estimate consumption under a new price schedule.
32We use equation (12) and the estimated demand model to evaluate one ﬁve-tier
tariff system. The speciﬁc tariffs considered here were issued in a major regulatory
decision by the California Public Utilities Commission in May 2001. They were im-
plemented the following month for approximately 7.8 million households served by
the Paciﬁc Gas and Electric Company and the Southern California Edison Company.
We should emphasize that California policymakers are pursuing additional initiatives
that may affect these households’ electricity prices in the future; we do not incorporate
adjustments after the May 2001 decision here.38
We use publicly available tariff books from the two affected utilities to identify the
terms of the new tariff applicable to each household in the RECS sample.39 We also
make some speciﬁc assumptions about the weather, which correspond to evaluating
these tariff changes under “normal” California weather conditions.40 The tier selection
probabilities in (12), which depend upon both the household and its particular tariff
schedule, and are evaluated using the normality assumption and household-speciﬁc
variance estimate from the econometric model. We evaluate the expected consumption
equation separately for each of the 1,307 households in the RECS sample, and average
these predictions using the survey sampling weights. A similar formula and procedure
is used to estimate each household’s (expected) expenditures under the new tariff.
Table 10 provides estimates of average household electricity consumption and ex-
penditures under the new ﬁve-tier tariffs. For comparison, we also show the values
obtained using the prior two-tier tariff schedules in effect from 1998 through 2000.
The ﬁrst numerical column presents estimated population means for all 7.8 million
households served by Paciﬁc Gas and Electric and Southern California Edison. The re-
sults indicate their average (and aggregate) annual electricity consumption would be
approximately 10 percent lower under the new ﬁve-tier tariff system than under the
preceding tariffs over a normal weather year. The corresponding increase in annual
household electricity expenditures is approximately 25 percent, or $179 per household
(in 1998 dollars). To put this in some perspective, $179 is eight percent of the average
1998 state personal income tax liability per household in California.
38Other ongoing changes to California households’ electricity prices include a three-month rebate pro-
gram for electricity conservation in the summer of 2001, indexed to the household’s prior summer energy
consumption; the expiration of a 1996 rate discount law that will cause households’ electricity prices to
rise by approximately 10% in March 2002; and a regulatory proceeding to revise the tariff-step reference
quantities,  x. These actions will produce minor adjustments to the major tariff revision examined here.
39Note that approximately ten percent of households participate in a low-income tariff program that is
exempt from the new tariff designs. These households appear in our sample, and our predictions for them
use their (unchanged) tariffs. The predictions do not account for changes in an eligible non-participating
household’s incentive to apply for this program, however.
40This amounts to using 30-year average heating and cooling degree-days from the NWS station located
nearest each RECS household.
33It is interesting to note that our expenditure results are considerably lower than
the ofﬁcial estimates of the California Public Utilities Commission. That agency pre-
dicted the increase in the two affected utilities’ total residential electric revenues
would be approximately $1.8 billion annually, or $228 per household. The difference
between these two estimates can be explained largely by differences in the assumed
demand elasticities. In particular, the Commission uses a so-called ‘static scoring’
method for predicting the revenue change associated with a new rate schedule design.
This amounts to assuming that each consumer’s annual demand is completely price-
inelastic, so that expenditures changes can be predicted by applying the old and new
tariff schedules to the same consumption data. Inasmuch as consumers do exhibit
some demand elasticity, this method over-estimates the revenue increase associated
with the higher tariff structure.
Since the model we employ is estimated with survey data, we have information on
individual households’ income levels that can be used to examine the distributional
consequences of tariff changes. This issue has not been examined quantitatively in
the state regulatory agency’s tariff models, as their analyses rely upon utilities’ billing
data. The additional columns in Table 10 report the model’s predictions for average
consumption and expenditures by household income quartile. Not surprisingly, under
either tariff electricity consumption and electricity expenditures increase with house-
hold income. What is interesting to note, however, is that in percentage terms the
change in household electricity consumption between the new and old tariff systems is
nearly constant across income quartiles. That is, the larger marginal price increases
paid by households consuming higher quantities more or less exactly offsets the in-
creasingly inelastic demand behavior of households with higher incomes (see again
Table 6).
A similar phenomenon is evident in the estimated expenditures. In absolute terms,
however, the increase in expenditures across income quantiles does not rise nearly as
fast as income. This implies, and can be veriﬁed directly in the unsummarized data,
that the new tariff is (slightly) more regressive than the system it replaces. It is,
however, considerably less regressive than a revenue-equivalent traditional uniform
rate increase, whose distributional impacts California policy makers have sought to
avoid.
9 Conclusion
The principal motivation for this paper is to better understand the effects of nonlinear
tariffs on consumer behavior. This subject has received little attention in the econo-
34metric literature on electricity demand, despite its considerable practical signiﬁcance.
It is our hope (perhaps naively) that this analysis might help practitioners in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere begin to resolve some of the uncertainty that pervades complex
tariff changes.
More work is of course needed. We should be the ﬁrst to acknowledge numerous
caveats to the foregoing empirical results—including the treatment of short-run versus
long-run effects, the evident under-sampling of consumption in the data, and the in-
herent uncertainty in extrapolating consumption behavior under marginal prices that
lie beyond the range of observed experience. All of these concerns suggest a degree of
caution is necessary in interpreting our numerical results.
It is worth noting that substantively similar methodological issues arise in a vari-
ety of other markets. Regulatory pricing of local telephone service (a perennially con-
troversial matter) and residential water use are leading examples. In those markets
nonlinear pricing is quite common, and formal demand analysis is a largely-accepted
part of the price-setting process. Some of the econometric issues addressed in this pa-
per would appear germane to those contexts. In a substantively different setting, there
are some interesting parallels between the analytical methods examined here and
micro-simulation procedures commonly used to evaluate marginal tax rate changes.
Speciﬁcally, the methodological aspects of implementing ‘dynamic’ versus ‘static’ scor-
ing techniques for tax revenues are precisely analogous to the treatment of consumers’
demand elasticities in the tariff simulation presented here.
Last, an interesting and useful extension of this research is the normative empir-
ical analysis of nonlinear tariff designs. The methods employed above would appear
to lend themselves readily to development of more economically efﬁcient tariffs. For
example, if the new ﬁve-part tariffs examined above are efﬁcient (in almost any sense
of that term), it is surely by fortuity rather than by design. Despite a great deal of
work in the theoretical literature on efﬁcient nonlinear pricing schemes, there are as
yet few (if any) detailed empirical studies. We leave this subject a matter for future
research.
35Appendix A. Elasticity Calculations
This Appendix describes the method used to calculate the elasticity estimates reported
in Tables 5 and 6. In the present application, calculating elasticities is more compli-
cated than in conventional (uniform pricing) settings. Because of the discrete structure
of the price schedule, a change in the consumer’s marginal price can move consumption
smoothly within a single tariff segment, shift the consumer off or onto the discontinu-
ity between tariff segments, or yield no change in consumption at all. Moreover, the
seasonal nature of electricity demand and price schedules imply that a household may
face different marginal prices in different times of the year.
We interpret a household’s price elasticity of electricity demand to be the (percent-
age) change in consumption resulting from a (percentage) change in the consumer’s
marginal price. Since these marginal prices may differ from month to month, the
annual elasticity estimates shown in the tables are calculated as the total change in
annual consumption associated with an increase in the household’s marginal price for
each month of the year.
Handling Price Schedule Discontinuities
From equation (1), we can write the optimal consumption for household i in month t
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ingness to pay for the last unit consumed. This marginal willingness to pay may differ
from the marginal price, if consumption occurs at the step-point  x where the price
rises from pL to pH. At that point, a small change in either price will have no effect on
consumption.
To account for this discontinuous feature of demand behavior in calculating elas-
ticities, we use the following decomposition. Consider an increase in the price of the
speciﬁc tariff segment in which the household initially consumes. Denoting this initial
marginal price as mp, and the consumer’s initial marginal willingness to pay as mwtp,
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36where y = xit(p
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it) is the rate structure discount (cf. equation (2)). The ﬁrst term
in the square brackets is standard. The remaining terms in the bracketed expression
yield the additional income effect due to non-linear pricing (i.e., the effect of changing
the rate structure discount). For an optimizing consumer, the last term on the right-
hand side will be zero if consumption occurs at the step-point,  x, and one otherwise.
For the linear demand speciﬁcation with the two-tier tariff examined in the paper,
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where 1() is the indicator function, and ; are the price and income coefﬁcients from
equation (9). We deﬁne a household’s monthly price elasticity, it, in terms of the effect











A wrinkle arises in computing it: Since our consumption data are aggregated to an an-
nuallevel, we do not observe the household’s monthly consumption, x
it, nor its monthly
marginal price. Instead, we estimate x




using the conditional moment equation derived in (6) evaluated at the estimated pa-
rameter values. We then obtainthe marginalprice estimate, c mpit, from the household’s
rate schedule in month t for the quantity ^ x
it. Finally, we can compute each household’s
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where the ‘hats’ indicate estimated quantities.
Annual Elasticities
To obtain the annual price elasticities reported in Tables 5 and 6, we calculate (point-
wise) the percentage change in annual electricity consumption for a percent change in
the household’s marginal price in each month of the year. That is, for each household
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where xi is the household’s actual annual electricity consumption. Table 5 reports
estimated population means for all California households, obtained by averaging these
household-level annual elasticity estimates using the RECS survey weights.
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40Table 1
Average Price and Number of Households for California Electric Utilities
Number of Households Percent of Households Average Residential
Rate in 1993
a






Pacic Gas & Elec. 12:25 3;748;831 4;069;268 34:83 6 :6
Southern Calif. Edison 12:10 3;636;295 3;655;184 33:83 2 :9
San Diego Gas & Elec. 10:81 1;005;257 1;020;010 9:39 :2
PacicCorp (Calif.) 6:94 31;872 351;053 0:33 :2
Sierra Pacic Pwr. (Calif.) 8:79 36;581 169;317 0:31 :5
Investor-Owned Subtotal 8;458;836 9;264;832 78:58 3 :3
Municipal/Public Utilities
Los Angeles 9:85 1;168;229 1;169;431 10:81 0 :5
Sacramento 7:65 416;364 377;054 3:93 :4
Riverside 10:57 80;828 35;510 0:80 :3
Imperial 8:36 67;021 7;592 0:60 :1
Santa Clara 7:30 38;129 126;735 0:41 :1
Lompoc 9:21 12;729 61;569 0:10 :6
Plumas-Sierra 7:70 4;674 82;557 0:00 :7
Subtotal 1;787;974 1;860;448 16:61 6 :7
Other Municipal/Public Utilities
c 526;480 0 4:90 :0
State Total 10;773;290 11;125;280 100:0 100:0
aSources: US Dept. of Energy Form EIA-861 (1993), FERC Form 1 (1993).
bEstimate based on the 1993 RECS survey data (see text).
cHouseholds served by other small municipalities, rural electric cooperatives, and public power districts.Table 2a
Appliances Entering Electricity Demand Model
Mnemonic Appliance Description
Primary electric 1 if household has permanently-installed electric space heating
space heating (electric furnace, heat pump(s), or wall resistance units)
Central air cond. 1 if household has a central air conditioning unit
Room air cond. 1 if household has room window/wall air conditioning units
Electric water heat 1 if household has an electric water heater
ELECCOOK Electric cooking 1 if household has an electric oven and/or stove
ELECDRYR Electric dryer 1 if household has an electric clothes dryer
FREEZER1 Separate freezer 1 if household has a separate (stand-alone) freezer
FREEZER2 Second freezer 1 if household has two (stand-alone) freezers
FRIDGE2 Second refrigerator 1 if household has a second refrigerator
CLTHWASH Clothes washer 1 if household has an automatic clothes washer
DISHWASH Dish washer 1 if household has an automatic dish washer
PORTHEAT Portable space heat 1 if household has one or more portable electric space heaters
HOTTUB Hot tub 1 if household has a hot tub with electric heating
POOL Swimming pool 1 if household has a swimming pool
H2OBEDHT Waterbed heating 1 if household has a water bed with electric heating
MICROWV Microwave 1 if household has a microwave oven
NTV Number of TVs Number of televisions in household
Table 2b
Additional Explanatory Variables Entering Demand Model
Mnemonic Variable Description
PRICE Electricity price Monthly electricity price, in 1993 cents per kilowatt-hour
INCOME Household income Average monthly household income, in thousand 1993 dollars
HDD Heating degree days Monthly heating degree days base 60
F, in hundreds
CDD Cooling degree days Monthly cooling degree days base 70
F, in hundreds
NROOMS Number of rooms Number of rooms in home (excluding bathrooms)
NBATHRMS Number of bathrooms Number of bathrooms in home
NMEMBERS Number of members Number of people in household
FRSIZE Fridge/freezer size Size of appliance, in cubic feet
ATHOME At home 1 if someone is normally at home during the day
HUPROJ Housing project 1 if household resides in a public housing project
APTBLDG Apartment building 1 if household resides in an apartment building
RURAL Rural location 1 if household resides in a rural location
URBAN Urban location 1 if household resides in an urban location
YEAR97 Survey year 1997 1 if household data from 1997 survey waveTable 3
Electricity Demand Model Coefficient Estimates | GMM Method
(Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)
Explanatory Baseline Elec. Space Central Room Elec. Water Swimming Second Separate
Variablea Useb Heating Air Cond. Air Cond. Heating Pool Refrig. Freezer
CONST −24:6 379: 312: 814: 467: 514: −23:5 −108:
(49:9) (216:) (276:) (369:) (107:) (229:)( 6 1 :6) (57:9)
PRICE 0:4 −38:2 −23:2 −65:3 −35:3 −28:2
(3:8) (15:0) (22:1) (32:5) (9:6) (19:3)
INCOME 0:41 6 :39 :32 2 :3 −34:06 :4
(2:4) (13:1) (11:0) (21:5) (7:7) (10:1)
NMEMBERS 18:1 −8:0 −39:8 −53:74 9 :3
(3:4) (20:5) (16:8) (20:5) (11:1)
NROOMS 13:02 0 :61 0 :13 0 :1 −36:6
(4:5) (22:3) (17:9) (24:1) (15:8)
NBATHRMS 27:3 123:
(9:9) (41:8)
HDD −10:74 3 :8
(6:3) (22:1)
CDD −60:0 240: 46:5
(22:7) (58:8) (128:)
FRSIZE 6:5 7:89 :3
(1:7) (3:7) (3:3)
DISHWASH 20:41 1 :3
(11:5) (37:3)






Table continues next pageTable 3, Continued
Explanatory Baseline Elec. Space Central Room Elec. Water Swimming Second Separate



























aEstimated on 1307 California households in the 1993 and 1997 Residential Energy Consumption Surveys. The dependent variable is electricity
consumption, in KWh; parameter estimates are monthly demand coecients from equation (7).
bThis category includes all miscellaneous electrical appliances not explicitly modeled such as lights, household electronics, fans, and so forth. The
rst refrigerator is included in this category because ownership is nearly universal and its eect not separately identiable from other universally-
owned appliances such as lights.Table 4
Estimated Marginal Effects
(Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)
Eect on KWh consumed per month for: a
Explanatory Baseline Elec. Space Central Room Elec. Water Swimming
Variable Use Heating b Air Cond.c Air Cond.c Heating Pool
Price (cents/kwh) 0:4 −37:8 −22:5 −63:4 −34:0 −27:5
(3:7) (14:8) (21:3) (31:1) (9:5) (18:4)
Income ('000 $) 0:41 6 :29 :12 1 :6 −32:86 :3
(2:3) (13:0) (10:6) (20:8) (7:5) (9:8)
N. Members 18:0 −7:9 −38:6 −52:14 7 :5
(3:3) (20:3) (16:3) (19:9) (10:6)
N. Rooms 12:92 0 :49 :82 9 :2 −35:3
(4:5) (22:0) (17:4) (23:4) (15:2)
N. Bathrooms 27:0 119:
(9:8) (40:1)
Heating Deg. Days −10:64 3 :3
('00 F, base 60) (6:3) (21:9)
Cooling Deg. Days −59:5 233: 45:1












(Eects of additional appliances are shown in Table 7)
aEstimated change in monthly appliance electricity consumption associated with a unit increase in the ex-
planatory variable, ceteris paribus. The marginal eects shown are estimated population means, conditional on
appliance ownership.
bHeating-season months only.
cCooling-season months only.Table 5




a GMM Method OLS Method GMM Method OLS Method
All households −0:39 −0:28 −0:00 −0:00
Households with:
Electric space heating −1:02 −0:85 +0:00 +0:01
No electric space heating −0:20 −0:11 −0:00 −0:01
Central or room −0:64 −0:56 +0:02 +0:02
air conditioning
No air conditioning −0:20 −0:08 −0:01 −0:01
No electric space heating
nor air conditioning −0:08 +0:03 −0:01 −0:02
aAnnual elasticites (see text and Appendix A).Table 6
Price Elasticities by
Household Income and Electricity Consumption
Price Elasticity
a
Quartile Quartile Range GMM Method OLS Method
By household annual income level:
b
1st Less than $18,000 −0.49 −0.36
2nd $18,000 to $37,000 −0.34 −0.24
3rd $37,000 to $60,000 −0.37 −0.27
4th More than $60,000 −0.29 −0.19
By household annual electricity consumption:
1st Less than 4,450 KWh −0.46 −0.31
2nd 4,450 to 6,580 KWh −0.35 −0.28
3rd 6,580 to 9,700 KWh −0.32 −0.26
4th More than 9,700 KWh −0.33 −0.26
aMean annual electricity price elasticity for households within each quartile.
bApproximate California household income quartiles, in 1998 dollars.Table 7
Estimated Electricity Consumption by Household Appliance
Present Study Prior Estimates
a
Average annual use, in KWh: Households Avg. annual
with appliance, electricity use,





Elec. space heating 23:21 ;131 1;185
b 2;609{3;481
d




e 13:7 619 n.a. 476
d
Elec. water heating 15:62 ;389 2;835 3;658
Refrigerator 99:81 ;231
f 1;141 1;144
Electric cooking 46:0 258 451 822
Separate freezer 16:7 582 1;013 1;026
Elec. clothes dryer 32:2 795 1;090 1;000
Clothes washer
g 64:1 223 n.a. 100
Dishwasher
g 48:3 241 n.a. 250
Swimming pool 5:62 ;227 n.a. 1;500
h
Hot tub 3:51 ;288 n.a. 2;300
Water bed heater 5:1 606 n.a. 900
Microwave 83:4 388 n.a. 132
Televisions
e 98:3 482 n.a. 513
Notes:
aSources: US Energy Information Adminstration (1995), Table 3.1, and public-use micro les;
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (1997), Tables A6 and A7.
bEstimates for California households.
cEstimates for all U.S. households, except as indicated.
dRange of estimates for households in southwestern U.S. states (Calif., Nev., and Ariz.).
eEstimates are for all units in household combined.
fEstimate based on second refrigerator only.
gExcludes energy used to heat water entering washer.
hEstimate for pool pump motor only.
n.a. indicates an estimate is not available.Table 8
Within-Sample Predicted and Actual Consumption
Sample Data Estimated Model
Electricity Consumption Sample Standard Actual Predicted Average Within-
per Household, in KWh Actual
a Mean Error
b Error Mean Sample Error
Pacic Gas & Elec. 6,531 5,796 258 + 735 5,899 +103
Southern Calif. Edison 6,238 6,063 291 + 175 5,961 −102
San Diego Gas & Elec. 5,706 4,627 514 +1079 4,775 +148
Los Angeles Wtr. & Power 5,261 5,113 454 + 148 4,867 −246
All California 6,355 6,007 157 + 348 6,010 + 3
aWeighted average of the total residential sales (in KWh) divided by the number of residential accounts in
each of 1993 and 1997, as reported by each utility. Source: US Dept. of Energy Form EIA-861 (1993, 1997).
bStandards errors shown account for the multistage sample design of the RECS (see EIA (1994)).Table 9
Out-of-Sample Prediction Tests for 1998 and 1999
Utility Electricity Sales
per Household, in KWh Actual
a Predicted Dierence Std. Error Prob.
b
Panel A: 1998
Pacic Gas & Elec. 6,775 6,198 +578 252 0.02
Southern Calif. Edison 6,455 6,233 +223 280 0.43
San Diego Gas & Elec. 5,935 5,005 +930 580 0.11
Los Angeles Wtr. & Power 5,438 4,885 +554 498 0.27
Panel B: 1999
Pacic Gas & Elec. 6,905 6,187 +718 267 0.01
Southern Calif. Edison 6,423 6,257 +136 292 0.64
San Diego Gas & Elec. 5,964 5,078 +886 647 0.17
Los Angeles Wtr. & Power 4,866 4,826 + 40 496 0.94
aTotal residential sales (in KWh) divided by the number of residential accounts, as
reported by each utility. Source: US Dept. of Energy Form EIA-861 (1998, 1999).
bApproximate probability of a dierence between actual and predicted at least as large
(in magnitude) as observed, under the model.Table 10
Household Consumption and Expenditure Changes
with Five-Tier Tariff Schedules





a Households 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Consumption (KWh/year)
With 2 tiers (1998) 6,196 5,524 6,299 6,330 7,455
With 5 tiers 5,578 4,987 5,677 5,519 6,637
Change (%) −10.0 −9.7 −9.9 −9.7 −11.0
Expenditures ($/year)
With 2 tiers (1998) 718 633 734 734 873
With 5 tiers 897 770 921 925 1,120
Change (%) 24.8 21.6 25.4 25.9 28.3
aEstimated population means for the 7.8 million California households served by the
Pacic Gas and Electric Corporation or the Southern California Edison Company. For
calculation methods, see text.
bFor income quartile breakpoints, see Table 6.Quantity









* x −−2 −1.8 −1.6 −1.4 −1.2 −1 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0
Figure 2.  Estimated Distribution of
California Households’ Electricity Price Elasticities
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Figure 3.  A Five−Tier Electricity Price Schedule
Illustration for Southern California Edison, Residential Service





 Notes:  The "baseline" quantity,  x, varies across households and seasons.  The rates depicted 
              above are for the most common residential tariff schedule for this utility.  The "prior
              schedule" shown applied from 1998 through 2000.
 Source:  Southern California Edison PUC Advice Letter 1545−E, Schedule D, Tariff Sheet
               29197−E (2001).
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